



Power system resilience – enablers supporting an effective Blackout response

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Introduction

- A major electricity-related incident (**such as National Blackout Incident**) has a significant impact on the country.
- **Grid Code** require that a utility plan for a range of contingency scenarios, including those that have a **high impact but a low probability of occurring**.
- This paper focuses on the **resilience and technical planning** required for a blackout incident.
- It also discusses the **blackout recovery phases and technical considerations** for responding to a blackout incident.
- The paper concludes with a **discussion on the blackout facilities** and highlights the SA Grid Code (SAGC) and System Operator requirements for black-start capabilities, such as: (i) *Islanding schemes*, (ii) *Nuclear safety*, (iii) *Black-start facilities* and (iv) *Independent Power Producers*.



Utility Obligation

- The protection of critical infrastructure, such as that for electricity provision, is **crucial to government, regulatory bodies and society in general**.
- **Therefore**, it is **incumbent on the utility to be prepared for an eventuality** such as the entire disconnection of the IPS.
- Eskom's obligation as a **regulated entity** is directed by a number of **legislative and regulatory instruments**, such as the **Electricity Act, SAGC, Disaster Management Act / Framework**.
- **System Operator plan and prepare for a range** of disaster scenarios by compiling response and recovery plans as well as developing the capabilities to respond to extreme incidences including that of a **national blackout**.

South African Grid Code


The System Operator obligations are defined as follows:

- **Scheduling of generation and ancillary services** (*incl. demand response, reserve margins, black-start, unit islanding capability, and testing of these facilities*);
- **System reliability and safety** (*incl. connection conditions, load curtailment, generation merit order, loadshedding protocols, emergency and contingency planning*);
- **System security** (*incl. frequency, voltage and power quality, and specialised protection systems*);
- **Agreements for off-site supplies to nuclear power stations** (*incl. ensuring operable grid connection*);
- **Operational measures** (*incl. protection schemes, procedures, outage coordination and fault management*).



PLANNING TO RESPOND TO A BLACKOUT

- The ability of a utility to **respond and recover** in a coordinated manner to a national blackout incident depends on the **resilience strategies adopted** prior to it occurring.
- Appropriate **design, asset management and operational** philosophies be adopted to contain the severity and quicker recover.
- This establishes the capabilities (e.g. **black-start, unit islanding, standby generators**, etc.) and abilities (e.g. **technical response plan**, etc.) necessitated by the obligation previously discussed.



Blackout recovery mechanisms

- While the IPS has **multiple defense barriers**, these cannot guarantee that a blackout will be avoided.
- The restoration of loads and normalisation of the IPS focuses on efforts that support the blackout restoration process to achieve the following: (i) *create islands*; (ii) *stabilise islands* and (iii) *synchronise islands*.
- The **blackout recovery objectives** will focus on *minimising the severity; maximising the safety* and *restore by not comprising* the integrity of the restoration.
- Recovery phases should evaluate the IPS status and *organisational condition to contain, maintain and monitor the emerging risks* and threats to the response and contingency plans.
- The goals during the initial **reaction, response, restoration, reconfirmation and recovery** of the IPS are:
 - **Enablers to minimise impact;**
 - **Enablers for a fast and safe response; and**
 - **Efforts to minimise the consequence.**



Description phases to recovery

Reaction

- * Initial assessment power system status
- * Islanding units
- * Prepare Blackstart facilities
- * Activation of emergency response structures
- * Koeberg Auto Start activated

Response

- * Blackout scenario confirmed
- * Confirm restoration plans
- * Confirm readiness status
- * Div TCC Convened
- * Confirm strategic and tactical objectives
- * Invoke contingency arrangement (fuel, sustenance, etc)
- * Engage country and provincial structures

Restoration

- * Execute IPS restoration
- * Preservation of Gx units
- * Selected load restoration (Metro & customers)
- * Consolidate restoration and organisational status
- * Execute alternative business continuity plans (Finance, Commercial & HR)
- * Safe shut-down of units
- * Safe shut-down non-essential applications
- * Reporting of IPS status
- * Reporting of emerging threats and risks

Reconfirm

- * Normalise system configuration and restore essential and critical loads.
- * Tx network n-1 compliant, Generator units stabilised
- * Dx connected majority of top and medium customers connected

Recovery

- * Normalise abnormal network configuration, recovery non-essential application
- * Update status of Eskom business operations

Blackout response objectives

- In terms of the **Incident Command System (ICS)** the **blackout response objectives** to a blackout are defined for the **emergency response structures** at the strategic, tactical and operational levels.
- These objectives establish the foundation for **coordinated emergency planning** between the **different blackout planning roles** namely:
 - The Power System Black-Start Plan
 - The Utility Blackout Plans
 - The Country Blackout Plans
 - The Regional Blackout Plans
- Given the emergency planning roles, the utility emergency response structures require **defined emergency objectives to steer, coordinate and direct the response and recovery of operations.**

#	Eskom Blackout Response Objectives	Description
1	Contain the incident and enable system restoration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Successful operation of automatic systems (unit islanding) and/or black-start facilities Rapid incident assessment and blackout declaration Activation and mobilisation of response systems (golden hour)
2	Securely restore the national power system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoration of the power system in a deliberate, secure manner (to avoid a subsequent blackout during restoration)
3	Ensure the safety of personnel, plant, systems and the environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preservation of generation units and nuclear safety The safety of Eskom responders and general staff Operating plant within thermal limitation Safe shutdown of non-essential systems Manage environmental violation
4	Support the country region's and blackout response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination with national and provincial emergency response structures Liaising with Government Invoking contingency arrangement with key role players
5	Ensure the continuity of identified critical operations and staged recovery of all operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continuity of mission critical processes and operations Safe recovery of non-essential applications Recovery business operations to deliver product and service
6	Recover Eskom's reputation and stakeholder confidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demonstrate an effective technical and crisis communications response to all identified stakeholders Support country communication and stakeholder management.



Blackout response principles

- **Blackout principles** provide a basis for planning across operations to ensure the harmonization of technical switching plans between generator, transmission, distribution (Customers).
- The **principles forms** the foundations for the detailed procedure on how to restart the IPS.
- This is **crucial for the identification** of the following: (i) potential threats and vulnerabilities, (ii) the sequence of the restoration, and (iii) the mobilisation of resources to prioritised areas.
- This would include the following **restoration principles during the normalisation** of the interconnected power system:
 - Auxiliary load, N-1 (network rings), initial load pickup (power system security), customer base (residential), speed of restoration (slow with deliberate action), multiple island restoration, Nuclear safety.

Blackout (non)- technical considerations

- **Non Technical considerations**

- National Control will perform the blackstart
- Training: Control Centre staff must be skilled on execution of the black-start and islanding plans.

- **Technical considerations**

- Frequency Control
 - Frequency Control (load pick up and synchronizing of Generation), Generator Loading, Automatic Generation Control (AGC), Generator reactive limits, Synchronising of generators, Pumped Storage Generators, Bulk water and coal distribution.
- Voltage Control
 - Power Angle between Islands, Reactive devices, Surge Impedance Loading, Line length, Non power station ends first,
- Operating:
 - Cold Load Pickup, Load Type, Stability, Substation switching, Power lines auto re-closure settings, Returning a line to service, Independent Power Producers



Black-Start Facilities and Islanding

- **Islanding scheme:**
 - First option for restoration
 - Various islands will be formed
- **Black-Start Facilities:**
 - Two blackstart facilities
 - Test the blackstart facilities
- **Nuclear safety:**

Black-Start Facilities

- Existing System Restoration Plan is a **detailed procedure** on how to restart the power system following a blackout. This plan **continues to evolve** to incorporate new understanding based on simulation and testing.
- We are continuously pushing the barriers in black start testing by being **more realistic** in the test conditions and incorporating opportunities to learn from each test. These tests offer an opportunity to include a wider staff compliment in the technical and logistical aspects of black start.

Conclusion

- The planning to respond to a major electricity-related incident requires the **establishment of a number of capabilities to prevent and respond** to a national blackout incident.
- These **regulatory instruments require utilities to plan for a range of contingency scenarios**, including those that have a high impact but a low probability of occurring.
- This paper focuses describing the **blackout recovery phases and planning required for responding** to a national blackout incident.
- It provides a numbers of aspects a system engineer should consider when compiling it **technical blackout restoration plan**, such as: *recovery mechanisms, response objectives, principles and technical consideration*.
- The paper concludes with a discussion on the *black-start facilities, nuclear safety, IPP and OCGTs* consideration in the evaluation of the technical restoration plan.



THANK YOU – ANY QUESTIONS

